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Introduction
R&D-based models of economic growth have substantially contributed to our understanding of the interplay between Þrms' incentives to invest in R&D, economic growth and welfare. It has been pointed out that R&D may have positive as well as negative externalities, leaving the question whether there is over-or underinvestment in R&D in decentralized equilibrium (compared to the social optimum) theoretically ambiguous. 1 By trying to shed light into this ambiguity, both empirical evidence as well as calibration exercises strongly suggest that the social return to R&D signiÞcantly exceeds the private return to R&D (e.g., Williams, 1998, 2000; Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth, 2003) . For instance, Jones and Williams (1998) , by linking R&D-based growth models to the productivity literature, argue that "[a] conservative estimate indicates that optimal investment in research is more than two to four times actual investment" (p.1134).
Such evidence has alarmed policy makers. For instance, the Barcelona European
Council 2002 has brought consensus among EU members "to increase the average research investment level from 1.9% of GDP today to 3% of GDP by 2010, of which 2/3 should be funded by the private sector" (COM, 2003, p.3). In particular, the European Commission seems to be ready to provide Þrms with more Þnancial incentives to invest in R&D, arguing that "[p]ublic support is justiÞed by the recognised failure of the market to induce business investment in research at an optimal level" (COM, 2003, p.19 ). However, as pointed out by Romer (2000) in his informal discussion about U.S. government policies to encourage R&D spending, "[f]ew participants in 1 At least four externalities have been identiÞed by the literature (see e.g. Jones, 2003) . First, innovators do not take into account that their R&D output may enhance capabilities of future innovators, which has been called "standing on shoulders" or "intertemporal knowledge spillover" effect, introduced by Romer (1990) . Second, the equilibrium mark up which innovators can charge for a new design may not coincide with the consumer surplus created by a new good, i.e., innovating Þrms can appropriate only part of the surplus (Jones and Williams, 2000) . These two distortions promote underinvestment in R&D activities. Third, when new goods replace older goods, gains from past innovating effort is lost. This "business-stealing" effect, introduced by Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) , serves as a negative externality of R&D investments. Finally, overinvestment in R&D is also promoted by patent races, in which different Þrms work on similar R&D projects in the hope to be the Þrst to be assigned a patent for their innovation ("duplication externality"). allow for skill speciÞcity and educational choice, this calls for positive R&D subsidies to Þrms in order to induce a reallocation of labor towards R&D activity. This result critically depends on the assumption, however, that the (high-skilled) labor force is capable to perform both R&D and production activities without having to adjust to a change in occupation. One obvious drawback of this assumption is that labor supply of scientists and engineers is rather inelastic in the short-run, i.e., R&D subsidies are absorbed by rising factor prices for R&D inputs, as discussed in Romer (2000) , among others. This paper not only conÞrms this view but also shows that even by accounting for long-run supply responses, earnings of scientists and engineers rise unambiguously. This result is driven by the heterogeneity of individuals in ability.
It is consistent with empirical evidence by Goolsbee (1998) , who Þnds that a 10 percent increase in government spending on R&D affects both income and hourly wages of scientists and engineers by 3 percent even in the longer run. Moreover, the proposed theory suggests that R&D subsidies may reduce effective aggregate supply of S&E skills, and may be detrimental to both productivity growth and welfare.
That is, R&D policy targeted to demand may not foster innovative activity when the speciÞcity and endogeneity of the supply of S&E skills is taken into account.
Fortunately, the analysis suggests a sensible and straightforward alternative to promote R&D-based growth: to target public R&D spending directly to the supply of skills. First, a promotion of extraordinary S&E talent does not affect the distribution of earnings, which is in sharp contrast to the result that R&D subsidies to Þrms foster earnings inequality. Moreover, and also in contrast to R&D subsidies, education spending on S&E skills unambiguously raise productivity growth. Finally, the normative analysis shows that the socially optimal structure of public education expenditure to different skills depends on the interaction between the relative effectiveness of the education system across skills and the effectiveness of private-sector R&D spending relative to the output elasticity of production skills.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of the model. Section 3 derives both the short-run equilibrium and the equilibrium with full educational adjustment to public policy measures (long-run). Section 4 studies the 3 socially optimal policy design with respect to both R&D subsidies and the structure of public education expenditure towards skills applicable in R&D and production activities, respectively. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes. All proofs are relegated to an appendix.
Basic Model
Consider the following overlapping-generations economy, where each generation is populated by L individuals.
Individuals
Individuals live for two periods. In the Þrst period of life, individuals live with their parents and decide (rationally and under perfect information) whether to specialize in S&E skills (i.e., to work as scientist or engineer), to acquire skills applicable in more routinized production processes, or to remain unskilled. Individuals have a unit time endowment in the Þrst period of life, devoted entirely to the acquisition of skills and leisure. Acquiring S&E skills is necessary to perform R&D tasks and requires z R ∈ (0, 1) units of time, whereas acquiring production skills requires z S ∈ (0, 1) units of time. In the second period of life (adulthood), individuals supply their skills inelastically to a perfect labor market. After specializing in, e.g., S&E skills, an individual cannot work in routinized production, and vice versa. 3 This reßects the notion that, say, a lawyer or bookkeeper cannot do research on software and an IT specialist cannot be employed as lawyer or bookkeeper. Individuals differ in the ability to perform R&D tasks after having acquired S&E skills, denoted by a. As will be speciÞed in section 2.3, this is reßected by differences in efficiency units of S&E skills possessed by R&D workers, after incurring z R units of time. In order to focus the analysis on an ability type which is relevant for knowledge spillovers and growth, this is the only source of individual heterogeneity in the model. 4 Intertemporal preferences of an individual i born in t − 1 (i.e., a member i of generation t − 1) are deÞned over leisure time in the Þrst period of life, d t−1 (i), and consumption during adulthood (e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar, 2003) . The utility function is speciÞed as
where
σ > 1, is an index of differentiated goods (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977 );x t (i, j) denotes the quantity of good j ∈ [0, n t ] consumed by member i of generation t−1 in period t.
The measure n t is referred to as the "number of products" in t. Note that, according to (2), individuals "love variety" in the sense that for any given total consumption of differentiated goods, nx, utility increases with n.
Firms
Each producer manufactures one variety of the differentiated goods in monopolistic competition. Firms have the following simple Cobb-Douglas production technology:
and l U t (j) denote efficiency units of skilled and unskilled productionrelated labor employed in Þrm j at date t, respectively, whereas x t (j) and A t (j) are output and total factor productivity of Þrm j in t.
In each period t, Þrm j can affect productivity A t (j) by employing scientists and engineers. 5 In line with growth theory based on in-house R&D (e.g., Young, 1998) and the IO literature on innovation activities (e.g., Sutton, 1998) , R&D outlays are (endogenous) sunk costs for Þrms. Productivity A t (j) of Þrm j in any period t ≥ 0 evolves according to
where l R t (j) denotes the efficiency units of R&D labor investments of Þrm j in period t and h(·) is an increasing function. 6 For simplicity, h(·) is speciÞed as
where γ > 0 measures the effectiveness of R&D. Moreover,
0 < ε ≤ 1, reßects an intertemporal spillover effect from previous investments of Þrms in R&D, t ≥ 1, whereS −1 > 0 is historically given. 7 Note that, according to (6), if each Þrm chooses the same R&D investment, i.e., if l R t−1 (j) = l R t−1 for all j (which will be the case in equilibrium), thenS t−1 =S t−2 (n t−1 ) 1−ε h(l R t−1 ). Thus, 5 An alternative formulation is that Þrms have to incur R&D expenditure one period in advance of production (Þnanced by borrowing), like in the (discrete-time) inÞnite-horizon growth model of Young (1998) . (See also Grossmann, 2003 .) However, this assumption seems to be less plausible in an OLG model. Rather, for simplicity (since irrelevant for the main arguments of this paper), the analysis abstracts from savings and asset markets. 6 Alternatively to the analysis of productivity-enhancing technological progress, one could allow for improvements in the quality of goods.
, where q t (j) is perceived quality of good j in t, and let A t (j) = A > 0 for all j and t. Moreover, let quality q t (j), rather than A t (j), evolve according to the right-hand side of (4). It is easy to show that, under these modiÞcations, all results in this paper remain exactly the same. 7 Regarding intellectual property rights, (4) and (6) imply that innovations are proprietary knowledge for one period only. 6 if ε = 1, thenS t−1 is ceteris paribus independent on the number of Þrms, n t−1 .
This special case reßects the notion that innovations of Þrms are "equivalent" in the sense that Þrms come up with similar solutions to similar problems at the same time, having similar access to the state-of-the-art technologies (Young, 1998) . 8 In contrast, allowing for ε < 1 implies that the number of innovating Þrms in symmetric equilibrium positively affects future productivity growth.
There is free entry of Þrms into the economy, with a large number of potential entrants. At all times, Þrms have to incur standard Þxed cost f > 0 in terms of unskilled labor. 9 Since f has to be incurred each period and the intertemporal spillover effect cannot be appropriated by Þrms, the length of the planning horizon of Þrms is exactly one period (Young, 1998 ).
Educational Production and Government Spending
To focus on the role of public education spending, educational production solely depends on public expenditure for either type of education, development of S&E skills or production skills, respectively. 10 Denote public expenditure levels for S&E skills and production skills of generation t − 1 by G R t−1 and G S t−1 , respectively, and the population share of either type of worker in period t (i.e., one period after receiving education) by s R t and s S t , respectively. Moreover, let s U t = 1 − s R t − s S t be the population share of unskilled workers in t. The spending levels per student are given by
8 Consequently, as will become apparent, the speciÞcation ε = 1 eliminates the scale effect from population size L in the economy's growth rate. 9 The main results from the analysis are unaffected if production would also require a Þxed staff of skilled, non-R&D workers. However, the additional analytical complexity would be substantial, and is avoided here for the sake of simplicity.
10 It is straightforward to allow for certain forms of private human capital investments as well without affecting the main results of this study. One standard justiÞcation for public Þnance of education is the incapability of individuals to borrow for educational purposes. As a matter of fact, public education systems are particularly prevalent in Continental Europe. 7 respectively. Denote the set of individuals (of generation t−1) who supply S&E skills and production skills in period t by R t and S t , respectively. (Thus,
efficiency units of R&D labor. For simplicity, suppose ability a is uniformly distributed on the unit interval, i.e., a ∼ unif orm{0, 1}. Each individual i ∈ S t obtains
efficiency units of production skills; ξ k > 0, 0 < β k ≤ 1, k = R, S. (Recall that individuals only differ in their ability to perform R&D tasks.) Note that individual efficiency units of labor depend on per capita spending levels for education (g R , g S ), which reßects that publicly provided education is a rival good. Also note that educational production is subject to diminishing returns when β R , β S < 1. If remaining unskilled, an individual owns one unit of unskilled labor (e U t = 1). Recall that individuals inelastically supply their efficiency units during working life. Let w R t and w S t denote the wage rate per efficiency unit of S&E skills and production skills at date t, respectively. Unskilled labor is chosen as numeraire (w U t = 1). Using (8) and (9), the nominal income (or earnings) level of a member i of generation t − 1 (with ability a(i)), conditional on her educational choice, is thus given by
otherwise.
(10)
Let L R t , L S t and L U t denote aggregate supply of efficiency units of R&D labor, skilled production labor, and unskilled labor in t, respectively, where L R 0 , L S 0 and L U 0 are historically given. At each t, besides Þnancing education, the government may subsidize R&D 8 spending of Þrms at rate µ t ∈ [0, 1). For any t ≥ 1, µ t is announced at least one period in advance, which implies that members of generation t − 1 take µ t into account when choosing among educational Þelds. Both education expenditure and R&D subsidies are Þnanced by a proportional income tax on workers, where τ t ∈ [0, 1) denotes the tax rate at date t. The government budget is balanced each period.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
Equilibrium for Given Educational Choice
According to (1) and (2), utility maximization implies that the demand function faced by Þrm j in period t is given by 11
Þnal consumption goods (which equals aggregate disposable income of generation t − 1 during adulthood), p t (j) is the price of good j, and
is the price index in t. It is easy to verify that P t is deÞned such that
i.e., for any individual i, the consumption index C t (i) equals "real" disposable income of i at date t.
11
Solving max
Integrating over all i and observing (12) conÞrms (11).
Using (11), output prices are set according to the well-known formula
t ≥ 0 (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) , where c t (j) denotes marginal production cost, which, according to (3) (and w U t = 1), are given by
.
Note that proÞts of Þrm j in t can be written as
Regarding the choice of effective R&D labor, l R t (j), the analysis exclusively focusses on h(l R t (j)) ≥ 1 (see (4)). Thus, using (4), (11), (14), (15) and (16), Þrm j solves
w S t , w R t , E t and P t as given. Hence, the Þrst-order condition for the optimal choice of R&D labor reads
Condition (18) says that the marginal beneÞt of an increase in R&D labor in t must equal its marginal cost. Note that the latter is decreasing in µ t , all other things equal, implying that demand for scientists and engineers is increasing in the R&D subsidy rate µ t . Using (5), it is easy to show that for the second-order condition for a proÞt maximum to hold, 1 > γ(σ − 1) is required, which is assumed throughout the paper.
Moreover, note that (18) implies l R l S t (j) = l S t and l U t (j) = l U t for all j, i.e., there is symmetry in equilibrium. Thus, besides conditions (14) and (18) from proÞt maximization, the following equilibrium conditions must hold for any t ≥ 0:
For given educational choices, the following equilibrium income levels result. (All results are proven in Appendix.)
Lemma 1. For any t ≥ 1, the following holds in equilibrium for given R t and
where Ξ ≡ 1 + (1 − α − γ)(σ − 1) > 0. 13 Thus, for given educational choices, I R in period t, µ t , raises demand of Þrms for S&E skills in t. For given educational choices, this unambiguously raises wage rate w R t , and thus, raises income levels of scientists and engineers, according to (10).
Before analyzing the implications of Lemma 1 for educational choices, consider the short-run impact of an increase in R&D subsidies, i.e., the impact of an increase in µ 0 on the equilibrium in period 0. 14 (G R 0 and G S 0 do not affect the short-run equilibrium since skills are supplied by individuals one period after receiving education.) Proposition 1. (Short-run effects). An increase in µ 0 raises w R 0 , and has no impact on n 0 , w S 0 and A 0 in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 implies that an increase in R&D subsidies to Þrms, which is unanticipated by individuals, merely serves as a windfall gain for individuals who happen to possess S&E skills. Thus, inequality across educational groups is raised, without affecting net wage costs of Þrms for R&D activity at all. Consequently, product variety, marginal production costs and productivity (i.e., inventive activity) remain unchanged, respectively. This result is an implication of the assumption that S&E skills need time to develop, i.e., are in inelastic supply in the short-run, as has been argued (informally) in the previous literature (Goolsbee, 1998; Romer, 2000) .
However, what has not been explored yet in the theoretical literature are the long-run effects and policy implications associated with educational decisions under skill speciÞcity and heterogeneity in ability. This is done next.
Equilibrium with Endogenous Educational Choice
Substituting (13) into (1), using (10), and observing time requirements z R and z S for the acquisition of skills, indirect life-time utility of individual i from generation
t ≥ 1. Since individuals differ only in the ability to perform R&D tasks after acquiring S&E skills, in equilibrium, each production worker must be indifferent whether to acquire production skills or to remain unskilled. Thus, (1 − z S )I S t = 1, according to (21). Moreover, (21) implies that individuals choose to become scientist
, there exists a unique threshold ability level at each date t, denotedã t , which is
Consequently, for any t ≥ 1, the set of individuals who acquire S&E skills is given by R t = {i| a(i) ≥ã t }. Recalling that ability a is uniformly distributed on the unit interval, this implies
The following proposition summarizes these results and states, in addition, how educational shares s R t , s S t and s U t , and equilibrium income levels of scientists and engineers, I R t (a(i)), depend on public policy, µ t , G R t−1 and G S t−1 .
Proposition 2. (Educational choice and equilibrium income). For any t ≥ 1,
(b) there exists a unique threshold ability level
15 Educational choices do neither depend on the income tax rate, τ t , nor on the price index, P t . Thus, the analysis abstracts from distortions of educational decisions through income taxation which would arise from, say, a progressive tax system. 16 Θ > 0 is implied by α < 1, z S < 1 and γ(σ − 1) < 1.
13 moreover, bothã t and s R t are independent of G k t−1 , k = R, S; (d) both s S t and s U t are decreasing in µ t and independent of G k t−1 , k = R, S; (e) Þnally, we have
Thus, for all a(i) ∈ (ã t , 1], I R t (a(i)) is increasing in µ t and independent of G k t−1 , k = R, S.
Comparative-static results in Proposition 2 can be understood as follows. Since changes in public education spending, G R t−1 or G S t−1 , have no impact on income levels for given educational choices of generation t − 1, according to Lemma 1, they do not affect educational choices. In contrast, an increase in the R&D subsidy rate, µ t , by raising demand for R&D labor, has a positive impact on the fraction of scientists and engineers in the population, s R group, 18 i.e., σ R t ≡ I R t (1)/I R t (ã t ). Thus, σ R t = 1/ã t , according to (23). Moreover, between-group inequality, denoted σ R/P t , is deÞned as ratio of average income levels between R&D workers,
R 1 a t I R t (a)da, and production workers,
The following result arises. Lemma 2. For any t ≥ 1, the following holds in equilibrium.
Thus, an increase in µ t reduces both n t and w S t , and raises l R t ; the impact of an increase in µ t on L R t is generally ambiguous, but negative if β R = 1. Moreover, an increase in G R t−1 raises both L R t and l R t , but has no impact on n t or w S t . Finally, an increase in G S t−1 lowers w S t , but has no impact on n t , L R t or l R t .
For the intuition of the impact of a change in µ t on the variables in (24)-(27), Þrst, recall from Proposition 1 that for given educational choices, R&D costs of Þrms and thus the number of Þrms are unaffected by R&D subsidies. Also recall from part (iii) of Proposition 2 that an increase in the R&D subsidy rate, µ t , raises the incentive for individuals with mediocre abilities to acquire S&E skills, i.e.,ã t declines. In view of the previous remark that n t is unaffected by a change in µ t for a given fraction s R t of scientists and engineers in the labor force, this shift in the employment structure away from production activities lowers proÞts of Þrms due to a reduction in output, all other things equal. Thus, an increase in µ t adversely affects the equilibrium number of Þrms, n * . Moreover, and somewhat surprisingly at the Þrst glance, total supply of effective R&D labor, L R * , may decrease with µ t (e.g., if β R = 1), despite the fact that a larger fraction s R t of individuals chooses education in a S&E Þeld. This is because public education is a rival good, i.e., given total education spending, effective labor per head is decreasing if more individuals acquire education. Thus, an increase in s R t triggered by an increase in µ t exerts a negative externality on effective R&D labor per head, according to (7) and (8).
This demonstrates that R&D subsidies may be a rather ineffective way to stimulate R&D activity. The analysis also suggests that the primary policy goal should not necessarily be to raise the fraction of scientists and engineers in the population, 19 but to promote the skill development of the best talents, i.e., to emphasize excellence in the education system.
Due to the decline in the number of Þrms, efficiency units of S&E skills per Þrm, l R * , nevertheless increase unambiguously with µ t . Moreover, due to the rivalry of public education expenditure, since less individuals choose to acquire production skills when µ t increases, for any level G S t−1 , per capita spending for production skills, g S t−1 , rises. Thus, effective supply of production skills per worker increases. Consequently, the wage rate per efficiency unit of production skills (relative to the wage rate of the unskilled), w S t , declines when µ t increases. To understand the effects of changes in educational spending, recall from parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 2 that an increase in public education expenditure of either kind, G R t−1 or G S t−1 , leaves population shares, s R t , s S t and s U t , unchanged. Thus, an increase in G R t−1 does not affect n * or w S * , but raises effective R&D labor in total and per Þrm, L R * and l R * , respectively. In contrast, since an increase in G S t−1 raises effective labor supply of skilled production workers, it lowers w S * , without affecting n * , L R * or l R * .
Note from Proposition 2 and Lemma 2 that the economy is in its steady state from period 1 onwards if public policy does not change over time, i.e., if µ t =μ, G R The next result analyzes the effects of public policy for the rate of productivity growth, ϑ t+1 ≡ A t+1 /A t − 1.
Proposition 4. (Productivity growth). Suppose µ t =μ holds for all t ≥ 1.
Then,
Thus, for all t ≥ 0, an increase inμ unambiguously raises ϑ t+1 if ε = 1, whereas, for t ≥ 1, the impact of an increase inμ on ϑ t+1 is generally ambiguous if ε < 1.
Moreover, for all t ≥ 1, an increase in G R t positively affects ϑ t+1 , whereas ϑ t+1 is independent of G S t .
Let us start with the relationship between R&D subsidies and productivity growth. Recall from the discussion in section 2.2 that, if ε < 1, the number of innovating Þrms, n, positively affects knowledge spillovers in symmetric equilibrium (which is prevalent in the model), all other things equal. Thus, under (28), if ε < 1, an increase inμ (which is foreseen by individuals when making educational choices) has two opposing effects on productivity growth, ϑ t+1 , t ≥ 1. First, it raises effective R&D labor per Þrm, l R * , according to Lemma 2. Second, however, it reduces the number of innovating Þrms, n * , which has a negative effect on knowledge spillovers.
If ε = 1, all innovations are equivalent in the sense that the number of innovating
Þrms does not matter for knowledge spillovers, i.e., the second effect vanishes. 20 Thus, only in this case, productivity growth is unambiguously fostered by R&D subsidies. 21 20 According to (29), the growth rate in period 1, ϑ 1 , is unambiguously increasing inμ also if ε < 1. 21 Although ε = 1 seems to be a knife-edge case, one should note that it has a desirable property of removing "scale effects" regarding growth, holding per capita spending on S&E skills, G R /L, constant. That is, according to (24) and (26), productivity growth does not depend on population size L if ε = 1. (However, it is easy to see that even in the case ε = 1, there are scale effects regarding the level of productivity A t , and thus, regarding the level of output, respectively. See Jones (1999) for a discussion of this property of so-called non-scale models of endogenous growth.) Next, let us discuss the implications of public education policy for productivity growth. Recall from Lemma 2 that public education spending of either kind is unrelated to the number of Þrms, and thus does not affect intertemporal R&D externalities. Also note that public spending on S&E skills, unlike educational spending on production skills, affects innovative activity per Þrm. This explains why educational spending on scientists and engineers but not on other skilled workers is positively related to productivity growth. 22 Public education targeted to production skills affects welfare, however, as will become apparent in the following.
Normative Analysis
This section examines implications of the positive analysis on both the desirability of R&D subsidies and the optimal structure of public education expenditure from a normative point of view.
First, consider the public Þnance side of policy measures, which relates policy variables to the required income tax rates under a balanced government budget.
Lemma 3. With a balanced public budget, income tax rates are given by
and, for all t ≥ 1,
In contrast, if ε < 1, productivity growth is increasing in L (again, holding G R /L constant). Empirical evidence on the presence of scale effects regarding the long-run growth rate is, however, weak and inconclusive (for a comprehensive survey, see e.g. Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1999) .
That is, scale effects, although seemingly playing a major role in historical growth paths (Kremer, 1993) , have been severely questioned for the post-war period (e.g., Jones, 1995 Jones, , 2003 . This does not necessarily mean, however, that ε = 1 is the empirically relevant case, although it may mean that the model is not fully appropriate to deal with the scale effect problem which is prevalent in many models of endogenous technical change. 22 As argued in an earlier note, this property is well-supported by empirical evidence (e.g., Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991).
Thus, for all t ≥ 0, τ t is increasing in µ t and G k t , k = R, S. 23
Welfare of the initially old generation may be represented by some function f (τ 0 , µ 0 ), which negatively depends on the income tax rate, τ 0 =τ 0 (G R 0 , G S 0 , µ 0 ), and, possibly, positively depends on the initial R&D subsidy, µ 0 (because it raises income levels of scientists and engineers, according to Proposition 1). Moreover, to ensure an interior solution with respect to the socially optimal choice of G k 0 , k = R, S, suppose ∂ 2 f/∂(τ 0 ) 2 ≤ 0. The function f depends, in addition to a speciÞcation of social welfare for this generation, on the allocation of skills across adult individuals in the initial period, which has not been speciÞed yet. An explicit derivation of f from such speciÞcations would not yield further insights for the optimal policy mix, however, and is therefore left out.
First, recall that µ 0 plays no role for subsequent generations (i.e., does not trigger intertemporal knowledge spillovers), and merely affects the income distribution of the initially old generation, according to Proposition 1. Thus, if the social planner has no preference for windfall gains of R&D workers (in the initial period), we have µ 0 = 0 in social optimum. 24 For the sake of concreteness, suppose that the social planner maximizes the discounted sum of welfare of each generation. Moreover, let us employ an utilitarian welfare function for each generation. The social welfare function is then given by
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the time preference rate of the social planer. 25 
is indirect utility of member i of generation t − 1.)
Due to the lack of transitional dynamics in the model, the social planning prob- 23 Recall that Ξ and Θ are unessential, positive constants. 24 Formally, this is true if ∂f(τ 0 , µ 0 )/∂τ 0 | τ 0=τ 0 ·∂τ 0 /∂µ 0 +∂f (τ 0 , µ 0 )/∂µ 0 ≤ 0 for all (G R 0 , G S 0 , µ 0 ) such thatτ 0 (G R 0 , G S 0 , µ 0 ) < 1. (Note that ∂τ 0 /∂µ 0 > 0, according to Lemma 3, and recall assumptions ∂f/∂τ 0 < 0 and ∂f/∂µ 0 ≥ 0.) 25 Discounting of future generations may be normatively justiÞed by the presence of positive productivity growth. 20 lem entails that (28) holds, i.e., policy variables are time-invariant for t ≥ 1. 26 The socially optimal R&D policy, given constraintμ ≥ 0 (a non-negative R&D subsidy rate is imposed in order to allow for a well-deÞned corner solution of the social planning problem), can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 5. (Optimal R&D subsidy). For all t ≥ 1, the socially optimal R&D subsidy rate may be given by µ t =μ = 0. Provision of R&D subsidies is "more likely" to be detrimental to social welfare, the lower ε or β S , and the higher β R , but µ = 0 may also be optimal if ε = 1.
According to Proposition 5, although a positive intertemporal spillover effect is the only externality from R&D, it may well be the case that providing R&D subsidies is harmful. To gain intuition for this result, recall that, for any t ≥ 1, an increase in µ t =μ lowers the number of Þrms and products, n t = n * (μ), according to Lemma 2. This has two adverse effects on social welfare. First, except for the initially old generation, utility of all individuals declines due to the love-of-variety property of preferences. Second, if ε < 1, steady state productivity growth (driven by knowledge spillovers) may slow down whenμ increases, according to Proposition 4, even though S&E skills employed per Þrm rise unambiguously. This effect is more likely to be negative, the lower ε is. However, even if an increase inμ unambiguously raises productivity growth (i.e., if ε = 1), it is optimal not to provide a demand-stimulus to R&D under plausible parameter conÞgurations (for an example, see the proof of Proposition 5 in Appendix).
Also β R and β S , which may be interpreted as the effectiveness of public education expenditure for the development of S&E skills and production skills, according to (8) and (9), respectively, systematically affect the socially optimal R&D subsidy. First, recall that an anticipated increase in µ t raises the employment share of scientists and engineers, s R t , and lowers the employment share of skilled production workers, s S t , according to parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 2, respectively. Thus, since education is a rival good, for any level G S t−1 , the positive effect of µ t on utility through a reduction in s S t and thus in w S * (which lowers marginal production costs) is strengthened by an increase in β S . In contrast, for any level G R t−1 , the positive effect of µ t on utility through an increase in s R t and thus in l R * is weakened by an increase in β R . 27 Proposition 6. (Optimal structure of public education). The socially optimal structure of public education expenditure can be characterized as follows.
(a) G R 0 /G S 0 = γβ R /(αβ S ) and, for all t ≥ 1,
(b) For all t ≥ 0, for a given policy to subsidize R&D, G R t ( G S t ) is increasing (decreasing) in β R , and decreasing (increasing) in β S ; moreover, both G R t and G S technology and are adversely related to the effectiveness of developing the other skill type. Moreover, since public education policy does not affect the equilibrium number of Þrms, a change in ε, which is critical for knowledge spillovers, has no impact on the optimal public education policy. Finally, educational productivity parameters ξ R and ξ S in (8) and (9), respectively, neither play a role for the structure nor for the level of the socially optimal education expenditure. Increases in ξ R or ξ S leave the elasticity of effective labor with respect to per capita spending levels on education, g R or g S , respectively, unchanged, and thus do not alter the optimal education policy.
Concluding Remarks
The question how to promote R&D activity in order to enhance productivity growth is at the center of public policy debates. Almost a third of R&D expenditure in the OECD is Þnanced by the government sector, e.g., through grants, project funding or tax incentives (OECD, 1999) . At present, the EU is planning an initiative to further the tax price elasticity of total R&D spending during the 1980s is on the order of unity". 29 However, as pointed out by Goolsbee (1998, p.298), "[w]hen the government increases R&D spending through subsidies or direct provision, a signiÞcant fraction of the increased spending goes directly into higher wages, an increase in the price rather than the quantity of inventive activity". Remarkably, this empirical
Þnding does not only hold in the short-run but also in the longer-run. 30 Indeed, R&D capital expenditure typically accounts for only 10-13 percent of business R&D (e.g., Hall and van Reenen, 2000) , so it is fair to say that demand-side R&D policy has mainly to be evaluated on the basis whether or not it stimulates employment of S&E skills.
By assuming that a given (high-skilled) labor force can be allocated freely be- As an alternative measure to promote R&D, an increase in public expenditure 30 These distributional effects may be quite substantial even at the macro level. In 1999, the U.S. workforce included about 3.5 million individuals employed in S&E occupations, where almost 2.26 million were employed in private, for-proÞt industries (National Science Board, 2002, Appendix table 3-12). An additional 3.35 million people whose highest degree is in a S&E Þeld but who are classiÞed as holding non-S&E occupations indicate that their job is closely or somewhat related to the Þeld of their highest S&E degree (National Science Board, 2002, table 3-2). In total, around 11 million people in the U.S. graduated in a S&E Þeld. 31 One may argue that this potentially negative relationship of R&D subsidies to welfare is a consequence of the modeling strategy to take labor as only input of the R&D technology. However, if anything, this argument calls for a special subsidy on R&D equipment, which accounts for a comparatively low fraction of total R&D costs, rather than for a general subsidy on R&D spending (Romer, 2000) .
targeted to the education of scientists and engineers neither affects the income distribution nor concentration in the economy, but unambiguously raises productivity growth. That is, because R&D activity primarily requires human resources with specialized skills, government policy should try to support the best talents by providing a high-standard S&E education. Interestingly, the widely-recognized "Sapir-Report" of a group of top economists on growth-promoting policies for Europe (on the initiative of the President of the European Commission) recommends a "substantial increase in government and EU spending for [...] postgraduate education, but at the same time putting the main emphasis on excellence when allocating the new additional funds" (Sapir et al., 2004, p.134 ; italics original). The analysis has given a theoretical foundation to this policy prescription; Þrst, by pointing out that the often heard distributional concern to an education system which aims at promoting excellence in ability of students and researchers is mistaken, and second, by showing that such a policy will unambiguously boost efficiency and growth. Moreover, the analysis has accounted for the welfare-enhancing effects of public education targeted to non-S&E Þelds as well. The optimal structure of public education spending towards different skills depends on the relative effectiveness of the education sector across Þelds and its interaction with the technological characteristics of Þrms' R&D and production activity.
The analysis also suggests to reconsider the policy-mix of public expenditure to promote growth. Even if R&D subsidies were socially desirable due to a potential rise in S&E skills, awareness and credibility of future public support for business R&D has to be enhanced in order to attract students to S&E Þelds. 32 Otherwise, the dismal short-run effect identiÞed in the analysis could be prevalent for quite a long period. Thus, by and large, supporting supply of S&E skills directly over the education system rather than indirectly through demand-side policies seems to be preferable.
However, by focussing on spending levels for the development of speciÞc skills, the analysis has just scratched the surface on how to improve the education system in order to enhance growth and welfare. For instance, the analysis has neglected the apparent cyclicity and uncertainty of private-sector demand for scientists and engineers (De Hek, 1999; De Hek and Santanu, 2001), which may give a disincentive to enter S&E Þelds. Moreover, the analysis has not addressed the concerns related to gender-speciÞc attitudes to S&E education and failures in primary and secondary level school systems which lead to an insufficient attraction of the best talents to higher-level education in general and S&E Þelds in particular (e.g., European Commission, 2003). The consequences of these issues for public policy measures towards R&D-based growth are left for future research.
Moreover, according to (3), the wage rate per efficiency unit of skilled labor in production (relative to unskilled labor) fulÞlls 
for any t ≥ 0. Substituting (A.5) into the labor market clearing condition (E2) for unskilled labor, we Þnd that, for any t ≥ 0, the number of Þrms is given by
with condition (E2) for skilled labor of type k = R, S, respectively, one obtains
(A.7)
For k = R, substituting (A.7) into (A.2) implies that, for t ≥ 0, the wage rate per efficiency unit of R&D labor is given by
Similarly, substituting both (A.7) for k = S and (A.5) into (A.4) yields, for t ≥ 0,
Next, note that for all t ≥ 1, total efficiency units of R&D labor are given by
where (8) has been used for the latter equation. Similarly, using (9), one Þnds
for the total efficiency units of skilled production labor. Total supply of unskilled labor is given by
Using (A.10)-(A.12), (A.8) and (A.9) can be written as 
Moreover, recalling that a(i) ∼ unif orm{0, 1}, we have
for all t ≥ 1. Substituting both (A.16) and (A.17) into (19), we obtain Thus, using (14) and (15),
Substituting (A.25) into (32), and using (A.26), social welfare can be written as
where F (ã t ) ≡ Recall τ 0 =τ 0 (G R 0 , G S 0 , µ 0 ) and, for t ≥ 1, τ t =τ (G R t , G S t , µ t ), from (30) and (31), respectively. Thus, substituting (A.24), (22), (24), (26) and (27) into (A.27), observing (28), and making use of P ∞ t=1 ρ t = ρ/(1 − ρ) and P ∞ t=1 ρ t t = ρ/(1 − ρ) 2 , which are straightforward to verify, yields
after some straightforward manipulations, where
Note that W * is strictly concave as function of G k 0 , k = R, S, and ∂ 2 W * /∂G R 0 ∂G S 0 = 0, according to (A.29), (30) and assumption ∂ 2 f/∂ (τ 0 ) 2 ≤ 0. Similarly, note that W * is strictly concave as function ofḠ k , k = R, S, and ∂ 2 W * /∂Ḡ R ∂Ḡ S = 0, according to (A.30) and (31). A social planner maximizes W * (·) with respect to (G R 0 , G S 0 , µ 0 ,Ḡ R ,Ḡ S ,μ). (Regarding µ 0 , the socially optimal solution has been discussed in the beginning of section 5.) Next, verify from (A.28) that F 0 (ã t ) = 1 − 1/ã t < 0. Thus, according to (A.30),
Note that ∂τ /∂μ < 0 and (a * ) 0 (μ) < 0, according to Lemma 3 and part (ii) of Propo-sition 2, respectively. Thus, according to (A.29) and (A.31), we have ∂W * /∂μ < 0 for allμ ∈ [0, 1) if, for instance, Λ (a * (μ)) ≥ 0 for allμ ∈ [0, 1). In this case,μ = 0 is socially optimal. To conÞrm thatμ = 0 is possible in social optimum, and in particular if ε = 1, the following numerical example is considered.
Suppose ε = 1, α = γ = 0.25, z R = z S = 0.5, ρ = β R = β S = 0.9 and σ = 1.1.
Thus, a * (μ) = p (1 −μ)/ [0.4 + 1 −μ], according to (22), andμ ∈ [0, 1) implies a * ∈ (0, p 5/7]. Hence,μ = 0 is socially optimal in this example, if Λ(a * ) ≥ 0 for all a * ∈ (0, p 5/7]. According to (A.32), Λ(a * ) = 9.775 − (1 − a * ) − 2.5/(a * + 1) + 0.25a * /(1 − a * ) in this numerical example. From this, it is easy to conÞrm that Λ(a * ) > 0 for all a * ∈ (0, p 5/7], which conÞrms thatμ = 0 is socially optimal.
For comparative-static results in Proposition 5, note that both a * andτ are independent of β R , β S and ε, according to (22) 
, 
